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The working-age population in Italy is projected to ini-
tially age significantly and to shrink over the next 30 
years. The decline is expected to be around 23% bet- 
ween 2018 and 2050 (see Figure 1). This will attenuate 
the country’s overall economic productivity and will 
have considerable consequences for its overall eco-
nomic development. This overview shows how demo-
graphic aging (the scenario “projected population”) in 
Italy until 2050 will affect key macroeconomic indica-
tors, compared to a scenario in which the population 
remains constant at the level of 2018 (the baseline 
“constant population (2018)”). 
The negative effects of demographic aging are ex-
pected to attenuate the growth of labor productivity 
until 2050. The difference between the scenario “pro-
jected population” and baseline scenario should in-
crease from around 1,2 euros per hour worked in 
2030 to 2,6 euros in 2040 and to almost 3,6 euros in 
2050 (in 2010 prices) (see Fig. 2).  
The growth of the real gross domestic product (GDP) 
ought to be significantly attenuated by demographic 
aging in the next few decades (see Fig. 3). In compa- 
rison to the baseline scenario, the increase is expected 
to be nearly 6% lower in 2030, nearly 15% lower in 2040 
and nearly 25% lower in 2050. In absolute terms, demo-
graphic aging and its negative effects are expected to 
attenuate GDP by 286 billion euros in 2040 and by 
493 billion euros in 2050 (in 2010 prices). 
With respect to real GDP per capita, which is in effect 
the average material prosperity per inhabitant, this is 
expected to result in the following: In 2030 it will be lower 
by about 1,000 euros, in 2040 by about 3,400 euros and 
in 2050 by about 6,000 euros than if demographic aging 
had not occurred (in 2010 prices) (see Fig. 4). 
In the baseline scenario, the savings rate remains vir-
tually unchanged until 2050 (see Fig. 5). Demographic 
aging will bring about a sharp rise in the number of 
people of retirement age and a simultaneous decline 
in the working-age population. This will lead to a sig-
nificant decline in the savings rate in the coming dec-
ades. The drop is expected to be by 2.8 percentage 
points (or about 13 percent) between 2018 and 2040, 
and to climb to nearly 3.5 percentage points (or about 
16 percent) by 2050. In 2040, the savings rate should 
be nearly 3.6 percentage points lower and in 2050 by 
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Figure 1  Historic and expected development of working-age 
                population (aged between 15-64 years), 1980- 2100 
Quelle: UNO - Department of Economic and social Affairs, Eurostat database. 
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FIGURE 2  Productivity per hour worked  
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 3  Potential output  
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 4  Potential output per capita 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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about 4.2 percentage points lower than it would be 
without demographic aging. 
This will also reduce the supply of domestic capital and 
thus the scope for domestic investment (see Fig. 6). 
The investment rate is expected to drop by about 2 
percentage points – or about 11% – between 2018 and 
2040 or 2050, respectively. In 2040, the investment 
ratio is expected to be at 3.8 percentage points lower 
than in the baseline scenario. In 2050, the difference 
is anticipated to be 3.4 percentage points. However, 
in an open economy, the domestic capital supply can 
be supplemented by capital inflows from abroad. 
The simulation calculations also confirm the theoretical 
assumption of rising inflationary pressure due to demo-
graphic aging (see Fig. 7). In 2040, the inflation rate in 
the scenario “projected population” is expected to be 
1.6 percentage points higher than in the baseline sce-
nario; in 2050, the difference is expected to be 2 per-
centage points.  
The simulation calculations project a higher current 
account surplus by 2040 in the scenario “projected 
population” than in the baseline scenario. This surprising 
result – demographic aging generally should reduce 
current account surpluses – can be explained as fol-
lows: The current account balance reflects the differ-
ence between gross domestic saving and gross fixed 
capital formation. If the investment rate drops more 
sharply than the savings rate due to the age structure 
(see Figs. 5 and 6: the investment ratio is expected to 
fall below the baseline scenario ratio by around 2.3 
percentage points in 2030, while the difference in the 
savings ratio is only 1.7 percentage points) the current 
account surplus increase (see Fig. 8). From 2040 on-
wards, the current account surplus is expected to de-
crease due to aging. 
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FIGURE 5  Gross domestic saving 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 6  Gross fixed capital formation 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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FIGURE 7  Consumer price inflation rate 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2018 2020 2030 2040 2050
as
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 G
DP
Baseline "constant population (2018)" Scenario "projected population"
FIGURE 8  Current account balance 
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations. 
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